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ABSTRACT 
 
 
It’s All in the Timing: Household Expenditure and Labor Supply 
Responses to Unconditional Cash Transfers 
Samuel Bazzi , Sudarno Sumarto**, Asep Suryahadi*** 
 
 
Targeted cash transfer programs have been an important policy tool in developing countries. 
This paper considers (i) how the timing of transfers affects household expenditure and labor 
supply responses, and (ii) how household expectations shape our interpretation of those 
responses. We study these issues in the context of a short-term program that provided 
quarterly unconditional transfers of US$30  to over 19 million households in Indonesia. Our 
empirical strategy relies on nationally representative panel data, difference-in-difference re-
weighting estimators, and the staggered rollout of the second quarterly transfer. On average, 
beneficiary households that received the two full transfers by early 2006 did not differ from 
comparable nonbeneficiaries in terms of per capita expenditure growth and changes in labor 
supply per adult. However, beneficiaries still awaiting their second transfer reported a 7 
percentage point lower expenditure growth and a reduction in labor supply by an additional 
1.5 hours per adult per week. The expenditure differences dissipated by early 2007, several 
months after the final transfer were received by all beneficiaries. We also exploit variation in 
transfers per capita to identify a small marginal propensity to consume out of transfer income 
(around 0.10). We reconcile the empirical results with the predictions of a simple permanent 
income model, consider rival (missing) data-driven explanations, and document similar 
household responses to other transitory changes in income. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Targeted cash transfer (CT) programs have been an important policy tool in developing 
countries over the last decade. Such programs have been shown in numerous settings to 
improve education, health, and other welfare outcomes among poor households.1 Recent 
studies have explored optimal program design along several dimensions (e.g., Baird et al., 
2011; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2011; Carrillo and Ponce Jarrí n, 2009; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 
2006; Filmer and Schady, 2011). However, despite a rich and growing evaluation of the 
literature, we have limited evidence on (i) how the timing of these changes in nonlabor income 
may affect household expenditure and labor supply responses, and moreover (ii) how 
household expectations shape our interpretation of those responses. 
 
In this paper, we investigate these issues in the context of a large-scale, short-term 
unconditional cash transfer (UCT) program in Indonesia. After slashing regressive fuel 
subsidies, the government of Indonesia provided nearly 19 million households with quarterly 
transfers of around US$30—roughly one-eighth of average quarterly household expenditures 
at baseline—between October 2005 and September 2006. We use well-timed, nationally 
representative household-level panel data from the National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas) 
to identify the household expenditure and labor supply responses over two time horizons: (i) a 
short-term period after which beneficiary households had received one or two quarterly 
transfers and (ii) a medium-term period by which time the program had ceased. 
 
Our identification strategy relies on multiple sources of variation in transfer income.2 First, we 
use a difference-in-difference (DID) procedure, re-weighting all households by their predicted 
probability of treatment (see Heckman et al., 1998; Abadie, 2005). Although beneficiaries were 
identified through a quasi-means testing process, we show that it is not possible to reconstruct 
the proxy means scores in a reliable enough manner to justify a fuzzy regression-discontinuity 
design. Nevertheless, our augmented model for predicting program receipt captures 
substantial variation in treatment status across households, and re-weighting effectively re-
balances UCT recipient and nonrecipient households along baseline characteristics. 
 
Second, we exploit the staggered rollout of the second transfer payment. This staggering arose 
as a result of delays in the local disbursement schedule across kecamatan (subdistricts).3 Due to 
the timing of the midline follow-up survey varying in respect to the disbursement schedule, we 
are able to identify variation in the timing (and hence cumulative magnitude) of transfers 
received across beneficiary households: one-fourth of all recipients were still awaiting their 
second transfers at the time of enumeration in early 2006. As we show, the staggering 
occurred primarily across large regions rather than across households within regions. 
Moreover, we document that the staggering process was as good as random insomuch as the 
timing of transfers and surveys cannot be explained by observable differences across regions 
in terms of remoteness, weather shocks, or level of development. 
 
 
                                                 
1See Hanlon et al. (2010) for a comprehensive review of the literature. 
2Not unlike similar programs in other countries, Indonesia’s UCT was implemented under politicized time 
constraints that precluded building evaluation mechanisms into the program ex ante. 
3Indonesia’s administrative divisions proceed from province to kabupaten (district) to kecamatan (subdistrict) to 
village. Local post offices at the kecamatan level were responsible for disbursing quarterly cash transfers to all villages 
within their jurisdiction. 
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Lastly, because the size of the transfer (per disbursement) was fixed regardless of household 
size, the scale of the benefit varied considerably across recipient households. We take several 
steps to show that the variation in transfers per capita is plausibly exogenous and hence can be 
used to identify an intensive margin treatment effect.4 De Janvry and Sadoulet (2006) make 
use of similar variation in treatment intensity imposed by the cap on total transfers in the 
Progresa program in Mexico, and Kaboski and Townsend (2005, 2011) analogously exploit 
variations in fixed financial transfers across Thai villages that vary in population size. 
 
Our first key empirical results suggest that the timing of transfer disbursements sharply affect 
the expenditure and labor supply responses. We find no mean differences in household per 
capita expenditure growth between control households (i.e., comparable nonbeneficiaries) and 
UCT beneficiaries that had received the two full  transfers as expected by the time of follow-
up enumeration in early 2006. However, the one-quarter of UCT recipients were still awaiting 
their second transfer at the time of follow-up enumeration, reporting expenditure growth rates 
that are roughly 0.075 log points lower on average than both control households and UCT 
recipients that had already received the second transfer. The largest difference across groups is 
found in food rather than nonfood expenditures. This relatively large differential treatment 
effect dissipates by early 2007, several months after the final quarterly transfer was received by 
all beneficiaries. Despite the null treatment effects on expenditures, we do find that UCT 
benefits are associated with some differential movement out of—albeit also into—poverty 
over both the short- and medium-term horizons. 
 
We also find similar differential treatment effects in terms of labor supply. Timely receipt of 
the second transfer by early 2006 had a null effect on the labor supply per adult,5 but a delayed 
receipt of the second transfer was associated with a decline of 1.5 hours per adult per week on 
average. Unlike the expenditure response, however, some of this difference across the two 
groups of beneficiaries persisted through early 2007, suggesting potential adverse medium-run 
labor market effects. 
 
These baseline estimates hold up to a battery of robustness checks as well as alternative double-
robust and control function estimators (see Busso et al., forthcoming; Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009). However, pooling the two treatment groups (i.e., ignoring the delayed receipt of the 
second transfer) and estimating a conventional binary treatment effect would have understated 
both the labor and expenditure response to the program. Although the sharp differences in 
outcomes across treatment groups are relatively well-identified by the exogenous staggering, the 
comparisons with the pure control group require stronger assumptions. Identification hinges on 
the probability of receiving any transfers being orthogonal to time-varying unobservable 
determinants of expenditures (or labor supply). In other words, targeting agents must not have 
allocated eligibility on the basis of idiosyncratic shocks occurring between enumeration at 
baseline and follow-up, but this was not captured in the latter survey.  
 
Exploiting an identification strategy which does not hinge on these same assumptions, we find 
that the scale of the transfers also matters. Conditional on the observed differences across 
midline treatment levels, expenditure growth is increasing in transfers per capita. We have 
estimated a marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of UCT income of around 0.10. 
                                                 
4Baseline household sizes do not vary systematically across treatment (and control) groups. Nor does the UCT 
program have any effect on the change in household size between periods. Also, although 7% of recipients 
report obtaining less than the full 30 USD per disbursement, this added variation is uncorrelated with all 
observable household and village characteristics. 
5Adults are defined as individuals 14 years of age and older. We find no response of child labor to the program. 
The SMERU Research Institute 
3 
Although this may appear small, the estimated MPC is economically meaningful. An increase 
in household transfers per capita by US$10 per quarter implies a rough increase of  5% in 
monthly household expenditures per capita. This within-treatment group comparison suggests 
an important intensive margin treatment effect, not unlike what has been found in other 
studies (e.g., Filmer and Schady, 2011). 
 
We attempt to rationalize the observed treatment effects of the UCT using a simple 
conceptual framework based on the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). In a canonical PIH 
model, household expenditures should exhibit a very small response to unanticipated 
transitory income shocks. The MPC out of UCT income should be equivalent to r/(1+r), 
where r is the real interest rate. Insomuch as the UCT program was not yet conceived at the 
time of the baseline Susenas enumeration in early 2005, households observed at that time 
could not have anticipated their receipt (or nonreceipt) of benefits beginning in late 2005. 
Thus, at midline in early 2006, households that received two transfers should have had an 
expenditure growth that is [r/(1+r)]× T larger on average than comparable nonrecipients and 
[r/(1+r)]× T/2 larger than households that received one transfer (where T is some 
proportional measure of transfers received).6 Given the real interest rates r≈0 around this 
period,7 it seems plausible that we could find a null midline average effect of the UCT 
program when comparing recipient expenditure growth with counterfactual nonrecipients. 
Even with r>0, any measurement error in expenditure or hours worked could make it difficult 
to obtain precise estimates of small treatment effects. These explanations could also generate 
the null effects observed at endline in early 2007. 
 
However, the large reduction in expenditures among recipients who had only received one 
transfer by midline enumeration merits an alternative explanation—albeit one that is still 
grounded in the PIH. Suppose that (i) at the time of forecasting their short-term future 
income for roughly the six months prior to midline enumeration, all UCT beneficiaries fully 
anticipated their receipt of transfers by early 2006, and (ii) r is sufficiently greater than zero to 
generate mean observable differences across treatment levels. Condition (i) implies identical 
expenditure growth among control households and recipients that had obtained the full two 
transfers as expected by midline. This setup also implies relatively lower expenditure growth 
among UCT beneficiaries unexpectedly still awaiting their second quarterly transfer at follow-
up. This gap can be interpreted as the effect of income falling short of forecasted 
expectations. In other words, savings were withdrawn too early ahead of the anticipated (but 
delayed) transfer. While neither expectations/timing convention are entirely dispositive, both 
highlight the value of the PIH in characterizing household responses to the UCT.8 
 
We go on to show that Indonesian households exhibit similar expenditure responses to other 
transitory covariate income shocks. In particular, we find that household expenditures per 
capita in rural areas increase in response to unanticipated positive rainfall shocks. However, 
the excess sensitivity is only found among households engaged in agriculture, whereas the 
treatment effects did not differ along this dimension of heterogeneity.  
                                                 
6Note that these all-else-equal comparisons hinge on (i) the re-weighting estimator balancing treatment and 
control households on baseline observable characteristics, and (ii) zero mean differences in unobservables across 
treatment and control households. 
7Despite relatively high nominal interest rates, consumer prices of many goods were soaring around this time as a 
result of the fuel subsidy cutbacks and the initial impact of the ban on rice imports (see Bazzi, 2012). 
8Of course, it is still possible that the differential treatment effects are entirely due to the difference in the 
amount of transfers received irrespective of timing. While we cannot rule this out entirely, the PIH could still 
explain the differential as being due to liquidity constraints that prevented transfer recipients from borrowing to 
smooth consumption between fully anticipated transfer dates. 
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Nevertheless, the null treatment effects of the UCT program seem to contradict results from 
numerous other settings. Why did unconditional cash transfers to relatively poor and 
(presumably) liquidity-constrained Indonesian households not yield the large expenditure gains 
typically found in the literature? One possibility raised in auxiliary fieldwork conducted by the 
authors (see Hastuti et al., 2006) is that UCT beneficiaries spent the transfer funds 
immediately within weeks, if not days, after receipt. If this expenditure took place sufficiently 
prior to enumeration, then the survey instrument might miss them. To the extent that these 
funds were used on durables, this does not seem to be the case since the results were 
unchanged when using a pro-rated measure of durable expenditures over the past year 
(roughly, March 2005–March 2006) rather than the past month, as in our baseline approach. 
Moreover, the results are robust to controlling for the date of midline enumeration in early 
2006 (though we do not observe the date of transfer receipt). Yet, we cannot rule out that the 
funds were allocated entirely towards immediate food expenditures as these are only recorded 
in the week prior to the survey enumeration. Ultimately, available survey data does not allow 
us to assess the actual amount of savings out of the transfer beyond that implied by our 
estimated MPC.9 
 
Another possibility is that targeting agents effectively identified ex ante are precisely those 
households that would likely experience the greatest adverse shock as a result of the 
generalized inflation caused by the fuel subsidy cutbacks. Although we account for a range of 
observable determinants of program participation, local program enumerators in mid-2005 
surely relied upon a much larger set of information  than was available to researchers in the 
baseline survey from early 2005. If such targeting based on expected negative welfare shocks 
took place systematically across Indonesia, then our estimates might simply reflect the 
differential forecasting ability of targeting agents. 
 
Yet another possibility is that recipient households strategically under-reported their 
expenditure so as to remain on the beneficiary lists that were under public scrutiny at the 
time.10 This source of nonclassical measurement error could bias the treatment effects 
downward if recipients perceived their ongoing participation as being contingent on reported 
welfare levels. We attempted to test for this source of bias by controlling  whether the 
household was assigned to the initial list by the village head (potentially more prone to 
patronage) or by a regional government official outside the village (less prone to patronage). 
In doing so, we find little evidence of any differential treatment effects along this dimension 
of the program. 
 
This paper offers new evidence on the importance of timing and expectations in 
understanding the effects of cash transfers on household behavior in low-income settings. 
There is a large amount of literature examining household responses to transitory changes in 
nonlabor income in the United States (e.g., Hsieh, 2003; Sahm et al., 2012; Shapiro and 
Slemrod, 1995, 2009; Souleles, 1999). These studies draw similarly rich insights using the PIH 
to understand why, for example, consumers do not respond to anticipated changes in after-tax 
income. At the same time, the analogous connection with the PIH has not yet permeated the 
large amount of literature on cash transfers in developing countries.  
                                                 
9A related concern is that certain asset purchases go unreported. In the baseline results, we employ data from the 
short-form expenditure questionnaire, which includes broad categories of durable goods and asset purchases. 
However, we find identical results in robustness checks using the long-form expenditure questionnaire, which 
contains much more detailed expenditure sub-categories and has been shown to yield higher total reported 
expenditures (see Pradhan, 2009). 
10The first few months of the UCT program in 2005 generated a great deal of public controversy surrounding the 
allocation of benefits and widespread perception of mistargeting (see Cameron and Shah, 2012). 
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There are, however, a few important exceptions closely related to the present study. Bianchi and 
Bobba (forthcoming) show that conditional cash transfers (CCT) delivered through Progresa in 
Mexico increase entrepreneurial activity among beneficiaries in advance of their actual receipt of 
the transfers. By exploiting the differential timing of the transfers across households, they are 
able to argue that the CCT increased entrepreneurship not only by relaxing liquidity constraints 
but also by encouraging risk-taking. Edmonds (2006) makes use of an analogous eligibility rule 
in the Child Support Grant program in South Africa, which gives rise to differences across 
beneficiary households in the timing of the receipt of transfers  but not the eventual total 
amount received. Contrary to the predictions of a canonical PIH model, he finds that 
households reduce child labor and increase schooling in anticipation of future transfer income, 
attributing the result to binding liquidity constraints. Beyond these two reduced-form studies, a 
recent structural evaluation of Progresa makes it possible to assess the effect of control 
households’ expectations over future transfers on the observed treatment effects (Attanasio et 
al., 2012). Failing to account for such expectations can lead researchers to understate the 
magnitude of actual treatment effects. Although this bias did not arise in the case of Progresa, 
the insights raised by Attanasio et al. resonate with our findings, which suggest that failing to 
account for unmet expectations over the timing of transfers would have led to substantially 
understated (and even negative) treatment effects on expenditure and labor supply outcomes. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background on the 
program and the dataset employed in the analysis; Section 3 motivates the evaluation model 
and details the identification strategy; Section 4 presents the primary empirical results; Section 
5 reconciles the main empirical findings with insights from a simple permanent income model; 
and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
II. BACKGROUND: CUTBACKS AND CASH 
 
 
In the midst of escalating global oil and gas prices in 2005, the Government of Indonesia 
(GoI) significantly reduced fuel subsidies, raising regulated prices by a weighted average of 
29% in February and then again by 114% in September of that year. These cost cutting 
measures yielded over US$10 billion in annualized budgetary savings, a portion of which the 
GoI put towards the country’s first large-scale unconditional cash transfer (UCT) program. 
This section details various features of the program relevant to understanding the household 
expenditure and labor supply responses to the transfer income. 
 
 
2.1 Fuel Subsidy Removal and Price Shocks 
 
The subsidy reform proceeded in two stages. In March 2005, the government raised gasoline 
and automotive diesel prices by 33 and 27% respectively. After several months and some 
publicity, the GoI dramatically reduced subsidies on October 1st, effectively raising the price 
of the three fuel products by a weighted average of 114%. Previously immune to policy 
change, kerosene prices nearly tripled increasing by 186%, while gasoline and diesel prices 
grew another 88 and 105% respectively. 
 
The direct effect of these price shocks on household welfare would depend first and foremost 
on the incidence of fuel consumption. Based on data from a nationally representative 
household survey (Susenas) from February 2004, prior to the first round of subsidy 
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downgrades, over 95% of Indonesian households consumed at least one of the three main 
fuel products, and over 90% consumed kerosene. Figure 1 examines the distribution of 
national fuel expenditure across deciles of household expenditure per capita in 2004. 
Automotive diesel and gasoline subsidies are most regressive while the overall incidence of 
kerosene consumption tends to be relatively flat across the distribution of income. The slight 
dip in kerosene consumption among wealthier households suggests a modest progressive 
element to kerosene subsidies. 
 
Share of National Expenditure on Main Fuels 
 
Decile of household expenditures/capita, 2004 
Figure 1. Benefit incidence of fuel subsidies, 2004 
Note: Calculated from Susenas 2004. Each point on the line represents that decile x location share of overall 
national expenditure on the given fuel product. 
 
Nevertheless, fuel products only comprise a small share of overall household expenditures 
among both rich and poor. On average, the poorest decile of households allocate 3.7% of 
their total monthly expenditure to kerosene while households in the richest decile spend only 
1.9%. Nearly 93% of the poorest households and 80% of the richest households purchased 
kerosene in the month preceding enumeration in February 2004. Meanwhile, only 6% of the 
poorest households directly purchased gasoline compared to 46% of the richest households. 
The corresponding average budget allocation for gasoline was 0.1% for the poorest 
households and 2.3% for the richest households. Therefore, although a large swathe of the 
population stood to be adversely affected by the kerosene and gasoline subsidy removals, 
these small budget allocations suggest that the pass-through to purchasing power would have 
to occur through more indirect channels. 
 
The regulated increase in fuel prices led to substantial consumer price inflation as a result of 
the rising costs of transportation and production of goods with substantial fuel-based inputs. 
Over the period from February 2005 to February 2006, the CPI increased by 17.9%. Figure 2 
shows the timing of the subsidy removals and the subsequent pass-through to other consumer 
goods and services. The year-on-year inflation rate provides a convenient benchmark as the 
nationally representative household surveys used in this study are conducted on an annual 
basis. The figure shows that the economy-wide effects from the limited downgrade of gasoline 
and diesel subsidies in early 2005 were relatively small compared to the large inflationary 
The SMERU Research Institute 
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upswing brought on by the second round of cutbacks in late 2005. Also, the path of food 
prices appears to follow a similar trajectory as fuel prices, albeit for largely orthogonal reasons 
related to trade policy.11 
 
 
Figure 2. Subsidies, transfers, and surveys: A timeline of events 
Note: Monthly price indices are obtained from Bank Indonesia’s online data system, November 2009 
 
 
2.2 UCT Program Implementation 
 
With the fiscal savings generated by the subsidy cutbacks, the government implemented a 
targeted unconditional cash transfer (UCT) program beginning in October 2005 and culminating 
in September 2006. The stated goal of the program was to provide four quarterly disbursements 
of 300,000 Rupiah (Rp) (around US$30) to the poorest 30% of households beginning on 
October 1st. Political exigency would ultimately dictate targeting and implementation.  
 
The targeting of beneficiaries proceeded in three stages. Firstly, local government officials 
devised a large list of potential recipient households in August 2005 using a combination of 
own-discretion and community-based records from prior government programs. Secondly, 
using a minimalist survey instrument (known as PSE05.RT), the local statistics agency 
enumerated households found on this initial list as well as on others from additional 
government sources. The survey questions concerned: (i) floor type, (ii) wall and roof type, (iii) 
toilet facility, (iv) electrical source, (v) cooking fuel source, (vi) drinking water source, (vii) 
frequency of meat consumption, (viii) frequency of meal consumption, (ix) frequency of 
purchase of new clothes, (x) access to public health facilities, (xi) primary source of income, 
(xii) educational attainment of household heads, (xiii) amount of savings and type of assets, 
                                                 
11Around late 2005, the price of domestically-produced rice—the main staple among the majority of Indonesian 
households—began a steep upward ascent due in small part to rising transport costs but mostly due to the 
government decision to ban rice imports in January 2004. While a boon to rice producers, the spike in rice prices 
had arguably more severe consequences for poor households than did the downsizing of fuel subsidies (see 
Simatupang and Timmer, 2008; McCulloch, 2008). 
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and (ixv) floor width.12 Lastly, the Statistics Indonesia (BPS) used the survey data to 
implement a proxy-means test to generate the final list of eligible households by the end of 
September. Although the PSE05.RT data and PMT scores are not available, the baseline 
Susenas data, which we describe next, include close proxies for all questions except those 
concerning savings, assets, and frequency of consumption. 
 
 
 
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
 
We employ several quasi-experimental identification strategies in order to evaluate the effect 
of the UCT on expenditure and labor supply outcomes. Firstly, due to a rushed 
implementation schedule and weak pre-existing targeting infrastructure, many nonpoor 
received benefits while many genuinely poor households did not. These targeting errors prove 
useful for the purpose of constructing counterfactual nonrecipient households through 
reweighting procedures. Secondly, for exogenous administrative reasons, the second quarterly 
transfer was staggered across regions with respect to the timing of the midline survey. We 
exploit this variation after showing that the staggering process is orthogonal to observable 
household and regional characteristics. Thirdly, because all households received the same 
transfer amount per disbursement, we observe considerable variation in transfers per capita. 
This allows us to identify—under certain testable assumptions—an intensive margin treatment 
effect as well as the (quasi-) marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of the transfer 
income. In the remainder of this section, we first describe the Susenas panel data and then 
detail the empirical strategies for exploiting the multiple sources of treatment variation. 
 
 
3.1 Data 
 
We use three waves of nationally representative panel data from the National Socioeconomic 
Survey (known as Susenas) collected in February–April 2005, 2006, and 2007. After matching 
households across the 2005 and 2006 rounds, we obtain a balanced panel of 9,048 households. 
We also observe a subset of households (N=7,016) again in February–April 2007.13 Susenas 
2005 provides a good baseline as it was implemented prior to the announcement of the UCT 
program and the large-scale subsidy cutbacks in October (see Figure 2). 
 
Taking advantage of the spatial mismatch in the timing of the midline survey and the rollout 
of UCT disbursements, we observe three levels of treatment denoted by the number of 
disbursements D∈{0,1,2} received by the time of Susenas enumeration in February–April 
2006. We observe 2,444 households in the treatment group (D>0), but 639 of these 
households had only received a single disbursement at the time of enumeration while the 
remaining 1,805 households had received two disbursements.14  
                                                 
12In practice, only 35% of households report ever being visited by enumerators, and 8% did not know whether or 
not their household was visited (according to Susenas 2006). The majority of those enumerated were visited not 
by BPS officials but by local government officials. 
13The baseline survey contains 10,574 households, while the follow-up in February 2006 contains 9,892 
households. The February 2007 survey meanwhile contains more than 55,000 households, a subset of which were 
interviewed in the two preceding years. See the notes to Tables 1 for details on panel construction. 
14Unfortunately, we did not observe the date on which households in the panel data received each of the 
disbursements. 
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The UCT program was intended to reach all poor and near-poor households (below 1.2 times the 
official region-specific poverty line). Recipient households were indeed poorer on average than 
nonrecipients in early 2005 prior to the UCT program (see Table 1). Yet, there was still evidence 
of potential (i) leakage of benefits, as 37% of UCT recipients were in the top three national per-
capita expenditure quintiles, and (ii) undercoverage, as half of the lowest quintile did not receive any 
benefits. Figure 3 bears out these targeting results. Whether benefits were actually mis-targeted 
based on proxy means scores is unanswerable with existing data, for the reasons discussed below. 
Regardless of this, only 50 (39)% of poor (near-poor) households received any transfers. In theory, 
the distributional overlap across groups, which is correlated with observable covariates 
h
X , 
should make it easier to identify credible counterfactual nonrecipients. 
 
Share of Recipient Types by Quintile of HH Expenditure/Capita, 2005 
 
Figure 3. Treatment level by baseline expenditure decile 
Note: D – d recipients obtained d UCT disbursements by enumeration in early 2006 as reported in a module 
attached to Susenas 2006. The quintile of household expenditures per capita is based on data reported in 
Susenas 2005. 
 
Despite the convenient panel setup, the Susenas data has an important limitation in that 
households only report a subset of the eligibility questions from the PSE.05 survey. We 
directly observe eight of the fourteen eligibility indicators in the February 2005 baseline 
survey.15 Among the most important questions unavailable in the Susenas survey are those 
concerning frequency of meal consumption, assets, and savings proxies. While it is not 
possible to obtain the actual household proxy mean scores that would allow us to implement a 
regression discontinuity design, we can use the available questions in Susenas coupled with the 
kabupaten-specific coefficients for each qualifying criteria to construct a quasi-PMT score.16 
                                                 
15A second limitation is that the data structure poses a somewhat nonstandard attrition problem. Although attritors appear 
much more similar to nonrecipients than recipients (see Table 1), we do not know which attritors between 2005 and 2006 
actually received the UCT. We observe recipient status among the 2,034 attritors between 2006 and 2007, and somewhat 
reassuringly the ratio of recipients to nonrecipients remains essentially unchanged across years. The attrition is largely 
attributable to the panel survey design, which drops and replaces around 20% of the original households at each new wave. 
Although inter-survey attrition is potentially a nonnegligible problem, we ignore its consequences in the econometric 
results presented below. Nevertheless, all results are robust to reweighting the sample so as to account for the probability 
of attrition as a function of all observable characteristics used to predict treatment. 
16We are grateful to Lisa Cameron and Hamonangan Ritonga for providing the PMT coefficients. 
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However, as we show in Appendix A, these reconstructed scores (i) fail to produce any (even 
remotely fuzzy) discontinuities around the stipulated thresholds, and (ii) underperform our 
estimated propensity scores (see below) based on a richer set of household characteristics 
plausibly available to local enumerators and village officials. 
 
Table 1. Expenditure Statistics, 2005 and 2006 
 2005   2006 
 Mean SD Min Median Max   Mean SD Min Median Max 
 Nonrecipients (N=6606) 
Expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 315 292 52 243 7702   356 300 31 272 4891 
Food expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 162 93 30 138 2790   182 104 20 155 1141 
Nonfood expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 153 234 8 94 7071   174 228 0 108 4236 
Education expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 11 60 0 2 2269   8 41 0 0 1660 
Health expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 11 67 0 2 2607   10 62 0 2 3137 
Below poverty line 0.10 0.30 0 0 1   0.11 0.31 0 0 1 
Quintile (nat’l) expenditure/capita 3.23 1.38 1 3 5   3.28 1.37 1 3 5 
Quintile (intra-province) 
expenditure/capita 
3.21 1.39 1 3 5   3.26 1.38 1 3 5 
 D=1 Recipients (N=639) 
Expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 185 93 49 165 843   195 118 41 170 1817 
Food expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 121 60 32 110 761   123 62 30 110 422 
Nonfood expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 65 49 9 52 423   72 80 9 56 1581 
Education expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 2 6 0 0 220   2 4 0 0 48 
Health expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 10 83 0 1 1832   4 11 0 1 150 
Below poverty line 0.25 0.43 0 0 1   0.34 0.47 0 0 1 
Quintile (nat’l) expenditure/capita 2.25 1.21 1 2 5   2.14 1.18 1 2 5 
Quintile (intra-province) 
expenditure/capita 
2.36 1.27 1 2 5   2.27 1.25 1 2 5 
 D=2 Recipients (N=1805) 
Expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 178 90 31 159 945   192 92 37 172 908 
Food expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 115 54 17 104 645   124 57 23 112 484 
Nonfood expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 63 50 9 50 576   68 51 0 55 682 
Education expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 3 8 0 0.4 220   2 5 0 0 68 
Health expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 5 11 0 2 178   5 22 0 1 751 
Below poverty line 0.28 0.45 0 0 1   0.31 0.46 0 0 1 
Quintile (nat’l) expenditure/capita 2.12 1.16 1 2 5   2.11 1.12 1 2 5 
Quintile (intra-province) 
expenditure/capita 
2.28 1.25 1 2 5   2.27 1.22 1 2 5 
 Attritors (N=771) 
Expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 323 272 54 252 2927    
Food expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 180 119 38 150 1073    
Nonfood expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 142 197 10 86 2497    
Education expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 7 27 0 0.4 563    
Health expenditure/capita (000s Rp) 13 55 0 2 750    
Below poverty line 0.14 0.35 0 0 1    
Quintile (nat’l) expenditure/capita 3.23 1.41 1 3 5    
Quintile (intra-province) 
expenditure/capita 
3.24 1.42 1 3 5    
Note: A balanced two-year panel is constructed by matching along (i) province-kabupaten-kecamatan-village-sampling ID-
household ID and (ii) household head names in the 2005 and 2006 Susenas panels. While a traditional merge along strict 
geographic identifiers provides a balanced panel of 9,797 households, significant discrepancies in household characteristics 
(including first names of household members) across waves indicate that survey administrators did not ensure the time-
consistency of household presence in the physical location of prior enumeration. A name-matching algorithm provided by 
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Robert Sparrow generated an initial balanced panel of almost 8500 households, and through further manual inspection, an 
additional 550 households were added. D=d recipients obtained d UCT disbursements by enumeration in early 2006. 
Attritors are those households which could be identified in the 2005 baseline survey but not in the subsequent rounds. 
Variable description: Rp stands for Rupiah. The exchange fluctuated between Rp9,500 and Rp10,500  to the dollar between 
October 2005 and September 2006. All expenditure variables are household per capita expressed in Rupiah per month. The 
underlying food expenditure items are recorded for the week prior to enumeration and scaled up to the monthly level by the 
factor 30/7. The underlying nonfood expenditure items are recorded for the year prior to enumeration and scaled down to 
the monthly level by the factor 1/12. Below poverty line is an indicator for whether or not the household’s total expenditures 
per capita fell below the provincial rural or urban poverty line in the given year. Per capita expenditure quintiles are 
computed separately within the full national sample and within the 31 provinces in which sample households reside. The 
2005 quintiles are calculated including attritors. The expenditure figures are not adjusted for inflation between 2005 and 
2006. Since we are estimating an outcome expressed as the (log) difference between 2006 and 2005, the inflation rate is 
subsumed in the constant in all pure OLS estimates. 
 
 
3.2 Identification 
 
In general, we are interested in the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of receiving d 
relative to s disbursements. Denoting this estimator by τds ≡ E [Y(d)–Y(s)|D=d] for some outcome 
Y, we aim to identify three parameters of interest τ≡(τ
10
, τ
20
, τ
21
) using the following difference-in-
difference specification for the change in log consumption (or some measure of hours worked),  
 
hthhht
DDC }2}0ln  (1) 
 
where τ20 ≡ τ21 + τ10 and the constant к is simply average growth in nonrecipient households. 
By taking differences, we remove all variation in the time-invariant determinants of 
expenditures across households. Given data and policy constraints, our goal is to ensure that 
the comparison of outcomes across groups is as close as possible to what one would observe 
if treatment status D had been assigned randomly. 
 
 
Figure 4. Overlap in estimated propensity scores (P) 
Note: Propensity scores obtained from flexible logit regressions (see Table 2. Observations to the left of the 
dashed vertical line fall within the Crump et al. (2009) optimal overlap region. 
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We pursue a re-weighting approach in which the contribution of nonrecipient households to 
the counterfactual is directly proportional to their estimated odds of treatment, )ˆ1/(ˆ PP , 
where Pˆ  is the household’s predicted probability of receiving any UCT benefits. We estimate 
this propensity score as a saturated function of (i) all underlying components of the proxy 
means scores (available to us in Susenas), and (ii) additional household characteristics that 
would have been known to local (informal) targeting agents at the time of eligibility 
designation. Figure 4 demonstrates the substantial overlap in propensity scores for treatment 
(D > 0) and control (D = 0) households. The full set of underlying parameter estimates are 
reported in Table 2.17 Given the considerable overlap, we then use the ω terms as inverse 
probability weights in order to rebalance recipient (D > 0) and nonrecipient (D = 0) 
households along observable dimensions. Empirically, less than 5% of the covariates in Table 
2 exhibit statistically significant mean differences (in t-tests) across recipients and 
nonrecipients after re-weighting by ω. Under the assumption that there are no time-varying 
unobservable determinants of consumption growth correlated with UCT receipt, we can then 
interpret the conventional binary treatment effect causally (see Abadie, 2005). 
 
Table 2. Propensity Score Model, P(Dh > 0 | Xh) 
Regressor Coefficient (Std. error) 
Urban Area -0.177 (0.114) 
HH Head Female 0.617 *** (0.114) 
Land owned (hectares) -0.099 *** (0.031) 
Land owned
2
 (hectares) 0.001 *** (0.000) 
HH ever participate in Rice for the Poor 0.961 *** (0.085) 
# children in school -0.102 (0.075) 
# children in school
2
 0.023 (0.020) 
Indicators for HH size∈{2,…,12}  [0.065]† 
Floor area -0.005 *** (0.002) 
Household composition (reference=Share Adult Males, 10+ yrs)   
Share Female Children, 0-9 yrs 0.619 ** (0.265) 
Share Male Children, 0-9 yrs 0.421 * (0.234) 
Share Adult Females, 10+ yrs -0.025 (0.186) 
Primary HH income source (reference=other)   
Trade/Retail -0.179 (0.117) 
Financial/Real Estate -0.782 (0.428) 
Agriculture 0.060 (0.126) 
Mining -0.235 (0.156) 
Manufacturing 0.158 (0.125) 
Electricity/Gas/Water 0.269 (0.882) 
Construction 0.260 * (0.141) 
HH head education level (reference=no education)   
Primary -0.283 ** (0.114) 
Junior high -0.571 *** (0.142) 
Senior high -1.091 *** (0.147) 
Higher -2.384 *** (0.347) 
 
 
                                                 
17Further details on the underlying variables and estimating equation can be found in the appendix. 
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…(continued) 
Regressor Coefficient (Std. error) 
Housing status (reference=other)   
Own house -0.085 (0.127) 
Lease house -0.132 (0.238) 
Rent house -0.386 (0.258) 
Free house 0.015 (0.227) 
Official house -0.719 (0.528) 
Roof type (reference=other)   
Concrete roof -0.849 (0.451) 
Tile roof -0.418 (0.328) 
Shingle roof -0.490 (0.437) 
Iron roof -0.410 (0.320) 
Asbestos roof -0.425 (0.422) 
Fiber/Thatch roof -0.400 (0.378) 
Wall type (reference=other)   
Brick wall -0.337 (0.304) 
Wood wall 0.023 (0.292) 
Bamboo wall 0.477 (0.307) 
Floor type (reference=other)   
Cement/Tile/Plaster floor 0.133 (0.538) 
Wood/Reed/Bamboo floor 0.290 (0.544) 
Earthen floor 0.797 (0.549) 
Source of drinking water (reference=other)   
Bottled water -0.978 ** (0.394) 
Pump water -1.039 *** (0.289) 
Tap water -0.427 (0.335) 
Protected well water -0.678 ** (0.272) 
Unprotected well water -0.918 *** (0.288) 
Protected spring water -0.985 *** (0.306) 
Unprotected spring water -0.883 *** (0.322) 
River water -0.929 *** (0.322) 
Rain water -0.562 (0.379) 
Buy drinking water -0.166 (0.153) 
Toilet facilities (reference=other)   
Own toilet -0.218 * (0.128) 
Shared toilet -0.016 (0.132) 
Public toilet 0.011 (0.220) 
Source of light (reference=other)   
PLN
a
 electricity 0.061 (0.597) 
Non-PLN electricity -0.082 (0.690) 
Pump lantern 0.899 (0.631) 
Oil lamp 0.648 (0.595) 
Toilet disposal location (reference=other)   
Septic tank -0.269 (0.175) 
Pond/Rice field -0.044 (0.206) 
Lake, river, sea -0.027 (0.150) 
Beach -0.034 (0.167) 
Constant 0.382 (0.938) 
Pseudo-R
2
  0.22 
Note: Estimated using a balanced panel containing 9050 households from Susenas 2005 and 2006 
Panel. Standard errors are clustered by village. All variables are as reported in February-April 2005. 
The regression also controls for province fixed effects. 
∗Significant at 10%.    
∗∗Significant at 5%.   
∗∗∗Significant at 1%.  
a
PLN is the state-run electricity company. 
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However, in order to identify the multivalued treatment effects in equation (1), we must 
(minimally) verify the exogeneity of the staggered rollout of the second quarterly 
disbursement. In Table 3, we show that the probability of receiving disbursement two 
conditional on receiving disbursement one, P(D =2 | D>0), is explained almost entirely by 
geographic fixed effects. Whereas household-level characteristics explain considerable 
variation in the probability of receiving any disbursements, P(D > 0), even with >600 
kecamatan fixed effects, household-level characteristics explain little variation in P(D =2 | 
D>0) after controlling for kabupaten or kecamatan fixed effects. The R-squared and F tests in 
columns 7–12 suggest that the staggering occurs largely across kecamatan/kabupaten and is 
plausibly exogenous with respect to baseline household characteristics. This is reassuring given 
that the kecamatan each have a respective post office branch, which was responsible for 
disbursing the quarterly cash transfers. 
 
Table 3. Idiosyncratic vs. Spatial Variation in Staggering 
Fixed Effects Province Kabupaten Kecamatan Province Kabupaten Kecamatan 
X
h,t−1
 controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
 specification: Pr(D>0) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fstatistic
xHo 0:  — — — 30.72 28.67 28.38 
[p−value] — — — [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] 
R
2
 0.049 0.167 0.237 0.236 0.326 0.385 
 specification: Pr(D=2 | D>0) 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Fstatistic
xHo 0:  — — — 2.93 1.66 0.90 
[p−value] — — — [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.705] 
R
2
 0.264 0.811 0.893 0.325 0.821 0.896 
Note: D denotes the number of disbursements received by Susenas enumeration in early 2006. Linear probability 
regressions for Pr(D=2|⋅) and Pr(D>0|⋅) are based on the sample of recipient and all households, respectively. There 
are 30 provinces, 339 kabupaten, and 619 kecamatan. 
 
Moreover, in Table 4, we show that geographic characteristics—both fixed (e.g., distance 
to urban centers) and time-varying (e.g., rainfall shocks)—cannot explain the spatial 
variation in staggering. There is little evidence that relatively poorer remote regions 
received the second disbursement any later than relatively wealthier, more central regions. 
Lastly, in results available upon request, we find that the date of survey enumeration in 
early 2006 is orthogonal to the level of treatment. In other words, households waiting for 
their second disbursement at the time of enumeration were not simply residing in regions 
enumerated at later dates. Thus, we are confident that the staggering process occurred for 
largely exogenous administrative reasons and hence can be used to identify multiple levels 
of treatment in the midline survey enumerated in early 2006.18 
                                                 
18We do not consider other approaches to identifying multivalued treatment effects (see Imbens, 2000; Cattaneo, 
2010) since the multivalued treatment in our case is plausibly exogenous with respect to household and 
geographic characteristics. Due to the covariates determining binary treatment status having very little predictive 
power in distinguishing between individuals with one or two disbursements (see Table 3), the approaches for 
identifying multivalued treatment effects using the generalized propensity score (i.e., predicting multiple 
treatment levels) offer little advantage and introduce additional noise. 
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Table 4. Staggering is Orthogonal to Interregional Differences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
log distance to kecamatan 
capital 
0.042 0.027 0.032 0.039 0.039 0.042 
(0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
log distance to kabupaten 
capital 
-0.057 -0.053 -0.040 -0.033 -0.034 -0.033 
(0.032)* (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) 
log distance to Jakarta 
0.005 -0.034 -0.033 -0.030 -0.031 -0.022 
(0.032) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) 
log kabupaten population, 
2005 
 -0.072 -0.075 -0.076 -0.076 -0.082 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.045)* (0.045) * (0.046)* 
urban village 
  0.064 0.067 0.069 0.074 
  (0.050) (0.049) (0.051) (0.051) 
village road paved 
   0.024 0.025 0.026 
   (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
village accessible only by 
water 
   -0.100 -0.100 -0.107 
   (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) 
log mean household 
exp./capita in kabupaten, 
2005 
    -0.008 -0.017 
    (0.093) (0.094) 
rainfall shock, 2005 
     0.120 
     (0.169) 
Number of households 2,383 2,383 2,383 2,383 2,383 2,383 
R
2
 0.010 0.022 0.025 0.031 0.031 0.031 
Note: Linear probability regressions based on the sample of recipient households using the following specification: Pr(Dhv=2 | 
Dhv>0)=γΖv+υhv, where Ζv comprises a vector of characteristics associated with the village or region within which household v resides. 
Distance to kecamatan/kabupaten capital is based on travel distance; distance to Jakarta is calculated by the great-circle distance. 
Standard errors are clustered at the kabupaten level in all specifications. The sample decline is due to a loss of villages in Papua for 
which I could obtain reliable matches. All other results are robust to dropping these households. 
∗Significant at 10%.   
∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗Significant at 1%.  
 
 
Log household expenditure/capita, 2005 (baseline) 
Figure 5. Baseline expenditure distributions by treatment status 
Note: All distributions estimated using Epanochnikov kernel and a rule-of-thumb bandwith. The “Control 
(Reweighted)” observations are adjusted using inverse probability weights (IPW) based on normalized estimated 
odds of treatment )ˆ1/(ˆ PP .  
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In Figure 5, we compare the distribution of log baseline household expenditures per capita 
across treatment levels. Given the exogeneity of the staggering process, it is not surprising to 
find that the distributions for treatment groups D=1 and D=2 are nearly identical and, in fact, 
statistically indistinguishable. Although mistargeting was rife, the control group is still 
substantially richer at baseline than the treatment groups. However, once we re-weight control 
households using ω, the control group distribution shifts leftward and overlaps with the 
treatment group distributions quite strongly. The slight disproportion of control households in 
the right tail of the distribution leads to a small, albeit statistically significant, difference in 
mean across the treatment and control groups (at the 10% level). This slight imbalance in the 
baseline outcome in levels poses a potential source of bias but only insomuch as that 
imbalance cannot be explained by observable time-invariant determinants of consumption. 
Otherwise the first differences will remove any bias. Other baseline covariates are effectively 
balanced after reweighting by ω (results available upon request). 
 
 
Transfers per capita (000s Rp) 
Figure 6. Distribution of transfers per capita through February 2006 
Note: The transfer amount reported by households is obtained from a module attached to Susenas 2006. 
 
In addition to variation in the timing of the second quarterly transfer, we also utilize the 
fixed transfer size to identify the marginal effect of an increase in transfers per capita. 
Baseline household sizes do not vary systematically across treatment (and control) groups. 
Figure 6 plots the distribution of transfers per capita (at midline in early 2006) for all 
recipients demonstrating the variation across households conditional on the number of 
disbursements d. The two disbursement recipients obtained median transfers per capita of 
Rp150,000 (mean Rp179,000), and single disbursement recipients Rp75,000 (mean 
Rp91,000). To identify the intensive margin treatment effects, we can simply augment 
equation (1) with observed transfers/capita and an exhaustive set of indicators for 
household size. Of course, this source of identification is not without caveats of its own. 
We address these in turn. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
Having shown (i) the baseline balance of reweighting control D=0 households by their 
estimated odds of treatment and (ii) the plausible exogeneity of the staggering process, we 
present the main empirical results in this section. In what follows, we report estimates of the 
multivalued treatment effects τ. In addition to pure OLS, we consider four alternative 
reweighting estimators. All are predicated on the inverse probability weighting (IPW) 
approach. The double robust estimator augments the IPW specification with controls for the 
linear propensity scores (
h
Pˆ ) or the covariates (Xh) used to predict those scores. The 
heterogeneous control function estimator introduces a fifth-order polynomial in the 
propensity scores and allows it to vary across recipients and nonrecipients. A review of these 
estimators can be found in Busso et al. (2009) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). Following 
suggestions therein, we trim 38 households with pP
h
~ˆ  where p~  is the optimal bound derived 
using the procedure in Crump et al. (2009). In all specifications, we also control for province 
fixed effects, which among other purposes, captures differential regional trends in (real) 
expenditure growth. Standard errors are clustered at the village level in keeping with the 
cluster-based sampling procedures of Susenas. 
 
 
4.1 Expenditures 
 
We begin by considering estimates of equation (1) for the log difference in consumption 
between t and t+1. The top panel in Table 5 presents our baseline results for the short-term 
period from 2005–6. We find a consistent pattern of differential treatment effects across all re-
weighting specifications discussed above: Recipients still awaiting their second disbursement at 
the time of enumeration in early 2006 have significantly lower expenditure growth—by 
roughly 7.5 percentage points—relative to nonrecipients and recipient households with both 
disbursements. Moreover, recipients of two disbursements have identical expenditure growth 
as nonrecipients.19 These results are largely insensitive to the estimator used with the exception 
that the OLS estimates of τ10 and τ21 are slightly lower. However, had we pooled the two 
recipient groups and estimated a conventional binary treatment effect—essentially a weighted 
sum of τ10 and τ21 with the weights equal to one and the share of recipients with two transfers, 
respectively—we would have understated the expenditure gains to receiving the full two 
transfers as expected by early 2006. 
 
Retaining the same specifications and moving ahead to 2007, the bottom panel of Table 5 
shows that the differential treatment effects dissipate over the two-year time horizon. This is 
intuitive since the UCT program had terminated by the time of enumeration in February–
April 2007, and all UCT recipients had received the full set of four quarterly disbursements.20 
 
                                                 
19Interestingly, the OLS estimates are statistically indistinguishable from the re-weighting estimates. An optimistic 
interpretation of this similarity would be that selection bias is limited after taking first-differences of the 
dependent variable and hence may be largely confined to the cross-section. The less favorable reading would be 
that the re-weighting approach (i.e., our estimated propensity scores) has not purged the sample of selection bias. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish among these opposing alternatives. 
20These estimates are not an artifact of the attrition of households between 2006 and 2007 survey rounds (see 
Section 3.1). Key results remain largely unaffected when re-weighting the sample to account for the probability of 
attrition, which is unconditionally identical across treatment levels and largely an artifact of administrative 
randomness rather than systematic household or regional characteristics. 
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Table 5. Baseline Estimates of Multi-valued Treatment Effects, 
Short- and Medium-Term 
Estimator 
OLS IPW Double Robust Control 
  (Ph
) (X
h
) Function 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Short-Term: 2005-2006 
τ10: receipt of disbursement 1 
-0.064 -0.089 -0.089 -0.089 -0.075 
(0.027)
**
 (0.035)
**
 (0.034)
***
 (0.030)
***
 (0.030)
**
 
τ21: receipt of disbursement 2 
0.051 0.073 0.075 0.070 0.076 
(0.030)
*
 (0.036)
**
 (0.035)
**
 (0.032)
**
 (0.033)
**
 
τ20 ≡ τ21 + τ10 
-0.013 -0.016 -0.014 -0.019 0.001 
(0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) 
Re-weighted No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity Score Control(s) No No Yes No Yes 
Xh Controls No No No Yes No 
Number of Households 9,010 9,010 9,010 9,010 9,010 
R
2
 0.045 0.088 0.091 0.170 0.104 
 Medium-Term: 2005-2007 
τ10: receipt of disbursement 1 
-0.037 -0.057 -0.066 -0.045 -0.025 
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
*
 (0.034) (0.038) 
τ21: receipt of disbursement 2 
0.029 0.032 0.035 0.009 0.031 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.038) (0.042) 
τ20 ≡ τ21 + τ10 
-0.008 -0.026 -0.031 -0.036 0.006 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) 
Reweighted No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity Score Control(s) No No Yes No Yes 
Xh Controls No No No Yes No 
Number of Households 6,992 6,992 6,992 6,992 6,992 
R
2
 0.044 0.056 0.062 0.146 0.069 
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is Δlog total household expenditures per capita between 2005 
and 2006/2007. In the top panel, the constant term in columns 1 and 2 (i.e., average nonrecipient log expenditure 
growth, or к in equation (1)) equal 0.107 and 0.109, respectively. In the bottom panel, the constant term equals 
0.113 and 0.153 in columns 1 and 2, respectively. Columns 2–5 are estimated by weighted least squares where 
the weights for treatment households equal one and the weights for control households are given by the 
normalized ω=
h
Pˆ /(1−
h
Pˆ ), where the normalization is over the entire sample for the given time horizon. Column 3 
controls linearly for the propensity score and column 5 for a fifth-order polynomial in the propensity score allowing 
it to vary by treatment and control. Column 4 controls for all covariates Xh used to estimate the propensity score. 
Standard errors clustered by village. All columns include province fixed effects. 
∗Significant at 10%. 
∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗Significant at 1%. 
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The main findings in Table 5 hold up to a number of robustness checks:21 
 
Timing of the Midline Survey 
One concern with exploiting the staggered rollout is that we are merely picking up differences 
in the time at which households received Susenas enumerators. The identification strategy 
hinges on there being differences in the disbursement schedule across households observed at 
roughly identical points in time. To ensure that differential enumeration dates are not driving 
our results, we control for 65 distinct days of enumeration across the country. Doing so leaves 
the results unchanged. 
 
Alternative “per capita” Formulations 
Some authors argue that when looking at household expenditure outcomes, one should 
account for the fact that children require less consumption (particularly of food) than adults to 
attain equivalent levels of welfare (see Deaton, 1997; Olken, 2006). We allow for this 
possibility by treating children as 0.5 or 0.75 adult equivalents where children are aged 0–9 or 
0–14 years. Again, the results are unchanged. 
 
Regional Differences in Inflation 
By including province fixed effects, we remove trend differences across regions in terms of 
inflation and hence of the pass through from fuel price increases to other consumer goods. 
We take two additional steps to ensure that local price differences are not driving our results. 
First, we deflate nominal expenditures using the nearest of the fifty regional CPI measures. 
Second, we control for increases in the price of the goods basket used to construct the 
kabupaten-specific poverty lines. 
 
Durable Goods Expenditures Beyond the Last Month 
In the baseline regressions, we measure durable goods expenditures in the last month. In so 
doing, our measure of expenditures may have missed important purchases using UCT funds 
prior to January 2006. In other words, the UCT may have led to an increase in expenditures 
several months prior to midline enumeration and perhaps immediately after UCT receipt in 
October-December 2005. Hence our comparison of durable goods purchases in the early 
months of 2005 and 2006 might understate the large positive effects of the UCT had we 
compared those purchases going back over the full year prior to enumeration. This does not 
seem to be the case. Pro-rating annual nonfood expenditures to the monthly level (or 
identically, pro-rating food expenditures to the annual level) leaves our key parameter 
estimates unchanged. 
 
Alternative Geographic Fixed Effects and Clustering 
All of the results in Table 5 are robust to including kabupaten fixed effects as well as to 
clustering standard errors at any administrative division above the village.22 
  
                                                 
21Detailed tables for all of these robustness checks will be made available in an online appendix. We also consider 
a range of alternative estimators for the binary treatment effect of receiving any UCT benefits including nearest-
neighbor matching (Abadie and Imbens, 2005), local linear matching (Heckman et al., 1998), inverse probability 
tilting (IPT) (Graham et al., 2012), and quantile re-weighting (Firpo, 2007). In all cases, the main qualitative and 
quantitative findings remain unchanged from those binary treatment effect estimates recoverable from Table 5. 
22Including kecamatan or village effects removes nearly all of the exogenous variation in the staggering of the 
second quarterly transfer and pushes the estimates closer to a simple binary treatment effects specification, which 
as noted earlier understates the expenditure response. 
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Participation in Other Social Programs 
Several other previously operative social programs continued alongside the UCT. Receipt of 
such programs might confound our estimates of τ parameters if, for example, the UCT 
disbursement schedule was timed so as to reach those households lacking other programs 
first. We control for participation in other programs (including a rice subsidy scheme, 
scholarships for poor students, and subsidized health insurance for the poor) and the results 
remain similar to the baseline. 
 
Systematic Underreporting of Expenditures 
One concern is that in the midst of public scrutiny over perceived program leakage and 
undercoverage, UCT recipients and particularly those still awaiting their second 
disbursement systematically under-reported their expenditures. This would lead to 
nonclassical measurement error and could explain the null or negative treatment effects. We 
(partially) test for this by controlling for whether the household was assigned to the initial 
list by the village head (potentially more prone to patronage) or by a regional government 
official outside the village (less prone to patronage). Again, we find no systematic departures 
from the baseline findings. 
 
Decomposing Expenditure Growth 
 
In Table 6, we find that the observed treatment effects are driven by differences in 
expenditures on food rather than nonfood items. Using the most flexible, control function 
estimator, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all three groups d∈{0,1,2} have identical 
nonfood expenditure growth. Over the medium term period 2005–2007, we find similar 
patterns with the minor exception that two disbursement recipients have slightly larger food 
expenditure growth than nonrecipients (τ21≈0.04). 
 
Table 6. Multi-valued Treatment Effects by Expenditure Type 
Growth Horizon ― 
Expenditure Type ― 
2005-2006  2005-2007 
total food nonfood  total food nonfood 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
τ10: receipt of disbursement 1 
-0.075 -0.093 -0.048  -0.025 -0.029 0.008 
(0.030)
**
 (0.030)
***
 (0.047)  (0.038) (0.035) (0.052) 
τ21: receipt of disbursement 2 
0.076 0.097 0.036  0.031 0.068 -0.033 
(0.033)
**
 (0.034)
***
 (0.050)  (0.042) (0.040)
*
 (0.057) 
τ20 ≡ τ21 + τ10 
0.001 0.005 -0.013  0.006 0.039 -0.024 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024)  (0.022) (0.021)
*
 (0.033) 
Reweighted Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score polynomial Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of households 9,010 9,010 9008  6,992 6,992 6,992 
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is Δlog household expenditures on the given commodity group per capita 
between 2005 and 2006/2007. All columns estimated by weighted least squares where the weights for treatment 
households equal one and the weights for control households are given by the normalized ω=
h
Pˆ /(1−
h
Pˆ ). All columns 
include a 5th order polynomial in the propensity scores that is allowed to vary by treatment and control. Standard errors 
clustered by village. All columns include province fixed effects. 
∗Significant at 10%. 
∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗Significant at 1%. 
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In Table 7, we further disaggregate food and nonfood expenditure items. In keeping with 
the specification for aggregate expenditure growth, we restrict the estimates for each 
commodity group to those households with nonzero expenditures in both periods.23 We 
find the same general pattern as with aggregate expenditure growth in Table 5. For most 
expenditure subcategories, recipients still awaiting their second disbursement have 
statistically significantly lower expenditure growth than recipients of two disbursements and 
nonrecipients.24 Moreover, the second disbursement almost entirely eliminates the gap 
between recipient and nonrecipient expenditure growth. However, we do observe slightly 
lower growth in recipient expenditures on prepared foods and substantially higher growth 
(≈11.2 percentage points) on durable appliances. Other statistically precise differences are 
observed for non-staple food expenditures and transport/communications. 
 
Table 7. Multi-valued Treatment Effects by Disaggregated Expenditure Group 
 τ10 τ21 τ20 
No. of 
Households 
total 
-0.075 
(0.030)** 
0.076 
(0.033)** 
0.001 
(0.017) 
9,010 
food 
-0.093 
(0.030)*** 
0.097 
(0.034)** 
0.005 
(0.017)** 
9,010 
      rice 
-0.039 
(0.038) 
0.056 
(0.044) 
0.017 
(0.23) 
8,777 
      tubers 
0.075 
(0.075) 
0.005 
(0.086) 
0.079 
(0.055) 
2,733 
      fish, meat, dairy 
-0.18 
(0.063)*** 
0.125 
(0.070)* 
-0.055 
(0.034) 
8,338 
      fruit, nuts, vegetables 
-0.128 
(0.046)*** 
0.121 
(0.051)** 
-0.007 
(0.021) 
8,850 
      other 
-0.083 
(0.039)** 
0.088 
(0.045)* 
-0.005 
(0.021) 
8,885 
      prepared food 
-0.226 
(0.070)*** 
0.154 
(0.078)** 
-0.072 
(0.037)* 
7,653 
      alcohol, tobacco 
-0.185 
(0.069)*** 
0.155 
(0.081)* 
-0.031 
(0.049) 
5,330 
Nonfood 
-0.077 
(0.058) 
0.042 
(0.063) 
-0.035 
(0.030) 
9,008 
      education, health 
-0.158 
(0.112) 
0.189 
(0.128) 
0.031 
(0.063) 
6,507 
      housing, utilities 
0.010 
(0.054) 
-0.030 
(0.057) 
-.0190 
(0.024) 
9,008 
      transport, communication 
-0.306 
(0.105)*** 
0.269 
(0.117)** 
-0.033 
(0.056) 
5,480 
      appliances 
-0.014 
(0.067) 
0.126 
(0.077)* 
0.112 
(0.044)** 
8,904 
      debt, taxes 
0.065 
(0.124) 
-0.145 
(0.137) 
-0.079 
(0.056) 
5,997 
Note: Each row corresponds to a separate regression with the log difference in the given expenditure 
category on the left hand side. All rows estimated by weighted least squares where the weights for treatment 
households equal one and the weights for control households are given by the normalized ω=
h
Pˆ /(1−
h
Pˆ ). All 
estimates include a 5th order polynomial in the propensity scores that is allowed to vary by treatment and 
control. Standard errors clustered by village. All estimates include province fixed effects. 
∗Significant at 10%. 
∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗Significant at 1%.  
                                                 
23The presence of zeros in one or both periods gives rise to a panel data sample selection problem. A fully 
specified demand system is beyond the scope of the present study, and lacking instruments for the extensive 
margin, we focus on the intensive margin of expenditure growth. 
24Two commodity groups, housing/utilities and debt/taxes, depart form this general pattern, though the results 
are statistically imprecise. 
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Intensive Margin Treatment Effects 
 
Having found robust differential treatment effects according to the timing (and total 
magnitude) of transfers received, we now consider an additional source of variation in the 
intensive margin of treatment. In particular, we estimate the following equation: 
 
 (2) 
 
Where (i) we retain the IPW reweighting strategy, and (ii) transfers is the total amount of UCT 
funds (in 100,000s of Rupiah) received by enumeration in early 2006, and (iii) capita and HH 
size are household size. After removing (i) the multivalued treatment effects through 
reweighting and the disbursement indicators, and (ii) the independent effects of household 
size through β
j
 terms, all that remains is information on the scale (or intensity) of UCT 
benefits. Under the assumption that E 0][
hht
HHsize  (after reweighting), ψ then identifies 
the marginal effect of an additional unit of nonlabor income per capita. 
 
Before considering estimates of equation 2, we address two potential concerns with the 
identification strategy underlying equation (2). First, if the UCT program caused changes 
in household size, then any observed effect on expenditures may reflect this intermediate 
relationship.25 We rule this out in Table 8, which applies the same reweighing estimators to 
the difference in household size as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 8. UCT Benefits Had No Effect on Household Size 
Estimator 
OLS IPW Double Robust Control 
  (
h
Pˆ ) (Xh) Function 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
τ10: receipt of disbursement 1 
0.004 0.033 0.033 0.013 0.031 
(0.057) (0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.062) 
τ21: receipt of disbursement 2 
-0.006 -0.036 -0.036 -0.011 -0.050 
(0.063) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068) 
Reweighted No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score control(s) No No Yes No Yes 
Xh controls No No No Yes No 
Number of households 9,010 9,010 9,010 9,010 9,010 
R
2
 0.005 0.011 0.011 0.054 0.015 
Note: All columns estimated by linear probability regressions with Δ log household size between 2005 and 2006 on the left hand side. 
Columns 2–5 are estimated by weighted least squares where the weights for treatment households equal one and the weights for 
control households are given by the normalized ω=
h
Pˆ /(1−
h
Pˆ ). Standard errors clustered by village. All columns include province fixed effects 
  
                                                 
25Note that controlling for the difference in household size does not solve the problem (see Angrist and Pischke, 
2009, on the “bad” control problem). 
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Table 9. Idiosyncratic vs. Spatial Variation in the “Tax” on UCT Recipients 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
household size, t−1 
-0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.000 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Fixed effects (FE) Province Kecamatan Province Kecamatan 
Xh,t-1 controls  No No Yes Yes 
p-value joint statistical significance   [0.52] [0.99] 
Number of households 2,410 2,410 2,410 2,410 
R
2
 0.113 0.822 0.187 0.827 
Note: All columns estimated by linear probability regressions of the following specification: Pr (transferh < full amount | D) 
= βXh,t-1+θFE +еh, where Xh,t-1  includes all the baseline household characteristics used to estimate propensity scores. 
Standard errors clustered by village. 
 
Second, local officials in some regions extracted a portion of the officially mandated 
Rp300,000 disbursement per beneficiary. Approximately 6.5 (8.5)% of recipients were subject 
to these informal taxes at the time of obtaining their first (second) UCT disbursement.26 If the 
incidence of informal taxes varied systematically across recipients depending on household 
size or other characteristics, then the estimated elasticity of outcome Y with respect to 
transfers per capita might be biased. In Table 9, we show that the probability of recipient 
household h being taxed is orthogonal to observable household characteristics. Tables 8 and 9 
point to the plausible exogeneity of household size with respect to other variation of interest. 
 
Table 10. Intensive Margin Treatment Effects by Expenditure Group 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Dep. Var.: Δlog total expenditures/capita 
transfers per capita (Rp 000,000s) 0.045 0.045 0.038 0.066 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** 
 Dep. Var.: Δlog food expenditures/capita 
transfers per capita (Rp 000,000s) 0.045 0.045 0.040 0.066 
 (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.011)*** 
 Dep. Var.: Δlog nonfood expenditures/capita 
transfers per capita (Rp 000,000s) 0.056 0.056 0.049 0.091 
 (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.015)*** (0.023)*** 
Treatment indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reweighted No Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score polynomial No No Yes Yes 
Household size indicators No No No Yes 
Number of households 9,010 9,010 9,010 9,010 
R
2
 0.106 0.121 0.106 0.121 
Note: Each cell corresponds to a separate regression. Transfers are rescaled to 100,000s of Rupiah (approx. 10 USD). 
Columns 2–4 are estimated by weighted least squares where the weights for treatment households equal one and the 
weights for control households are given by the normalized ω=
h
Pˆ /(1−
h
Pˆ ). Standard errors clustered by village. All columns 
include province fixed effects. 
∗Significant at 10%. 
∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗Significant at 1%.  
                                                 
26These taxes went primarily to officials in the village. According to recipients subjected to these taxes, the 
proceeds were meant to cover local ID/certificate administration, security at disbursement centers, but most 
were intended for redistribution to nonrecipients deemed deserving by local officials. The portion allocated to 
supposed local redistribution increased from 40% at the first disbursement to 62% at the second disbursement. 
Among those taxed, the median amount also increased from Rp20,000 to Rp50,000. These increases were likely 
due in part to the rising discontent with the initial eligibility lists. 
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In Table 10, we report estimates of ψ from equation (2) for total, food, and nonfood 
expenditures per capita. Columns 1-3 impose βj=0 for all j, and column 4 allows βj ≠ 0 ∀j to 
allow for unconditional scale effects in the growth in household expenditures/capita (e.g., 
larger households can better cope with shocks). The point estimates of 0.04–0.065 for total 
expenditures per capita imply a marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transfer income 
of around 0.08–0.11, where the MPC is simply the elasticity of expenditures per capita with 
respect to transfers per capita. The estimated MPC is slightly higher for nonfood expenditures 
and when allowing for unconditional scale effects. Although small, these elasticities are 
economically meaningful. The estimates imply that an increase in household transfers per 
capita by US$10 per quarter implies roughly a 5% increase in monthly expenditures per capita. 
We return to these estimates in Section 5 when discussing the theoretical implications. 
 
Expenditure-Based Poverty Transitions 
 
Before turning to labor supply results, we report in Table 11 the effects of the UCT program on 
changes in the poverty status of households. We estimate a multinomial logit equation with four 
possible outcomes: chronic poverty (i.e., poor in both of the periods t and t+1), moving into 
poverty (i.e., nonpoor in t, poor in t+1), moving out of poverty (i.e., poor in t, nonpoor in t+1), 
and never poor (i.e., nonpoor in t and t+1). The Indonesian poverty lines are kabupaten-specific 
and are calculated separately for urban and rural areas based on a local food consumption basket 
relevant to relatively low-income households. When estimating the multinomial logit equation, 
we retain the flexible, control function reweighting specification as in earlier results.  
 
Table 11. Poverty Transitions and the UCT (Multinomial Logit AME) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
chronic poor into poverty out of poverty never poor 
 
    
 Short-Term: 2005-2006 
τ10: receipt of disbursement 1 
0.218 0.099 0.014 -0.331 
(0.047)*** (0.023)*** (0.021) (0.041)*** 
τ21: receipt of disbursement 2 
0.003 -0.023 0.040 -0.020 
(0.026) (0.019) (0.022)* (0.033) 
τ20 ≡ τ21 + τ10 
0.221 0.076 0.053 -0.351 
(0.042)*** (0.076)*** (0.053)*** (0.033)*** 
Reweighted Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Actual probability 0.081 0.084 0.063 0.772 
Predict probability 0.080 0.085 0.065 0.770 
Number of households 9,010 9,010 9,010 9,010 
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 Medium-Term: 2005-2007 
τ10: receipt of disbursement 1 
0.086 0.112 0.105 -0.303 
(0.021)*** (0.030)*** (0.029)*** (0.038)*** 
τ21: receipt of disbursement 2 
0.014 0.009 0.024 -0.047 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.034) 
τ20 ≡ τ21 + τ10 
0.099 0.121 0.129 -0.349 
(0.017)*** (0.028)*** (0.018)*** (0.028)*** 
Reweighted Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score polynomial Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Actual probability 0.034 0.054 0.110 0.803 
Predicted probability 0.040 0.066 0.107 0.786 
Number of households 6,992 6,992 6,992 6,992 
Note: The poverty line varies across kabupaten × urban or rural administrative divisions. The average marginal effects 
(AME) are based on multinomial logit (base outcome is “into poverty”) where the weights for treatment households equal 
one and the weights for control households are given by the normalized ω(·)=
h
Pˆ /(1−
h
Pˆ ). Standard errors clustered by 
village. The regression includes province fixed effects. 
∗Significant at 10%. 
∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗Significant at 1%. 
 
The average marginal effects in Table 11 suggest that the UCT program had heterogeneous effects 
on poverty over the short-term period from early 2005 to early 2006. On the one hand, transfer 
recipients are more likely to stay poor and also become poor. Yet, we also observe that transfer 
receipt, particularly the second disbursement, is associated with movement out of poverty. 
 
We observe similar patterns over the medium-term time horizon (in the bottom panel of 
Table 11) albeit with a few important exceptions. Firstly, UCT benefits are associated with a 
large increase (of 0.13) in the probability of moving out of poverty. This holds regardless of 
the timing of second quarterly transfer at midline enumeration in 2006. Secondly, the 
correlation between UCT receipt and the probability of remaining poor falls by half relative to  
the short-term time horizon. In sum, although the UCT benefits did not lead to dramatic 
increases in household expenditures, the program did enable some households to move out of 
(officially-defined) poverty over both the short- and medium-term. 
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Table 12. Multi-valued Treatment Effects on Labor Supply, 2005-6 
Estimator 
OLS IPW 
Double Robust 
Control 
Function (
h
Pˆ ) (Xh) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Short-Term: 2005-2006 
τ10: receipt of disbursement 1 
-0.535 -1.710 -1.700 -1.838 -0.437 
(0.737) (0.887)* (0.859)** (0.842)** (0.773) 
τ21: receipt of disbursement 2 
0.422 1.168 1.240 1.411 0.843 
(0.846) (0.934) (0.927) (0.920) (0.874) 
τ20 ≡ τ21 + τ10 
-0.113 -0.543 -0.461 -0.427 0.406 
(0.451) (0.585) (0.563) (0.532) (0.525) 
Reweighted No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score Control(s) No No Yes No Yes 
Xh controls No No No Yes No 
Number of households 9,010 9,010 9,010 9,010 9,010 
R
2
 0.015 0.027 0.031 0.102 0.051 
 Medium-Term: 2005-2007 
τ10: receipt of disbursement 1 
-2.309 -2.571 -2.623 -2.285 -2.565 
(0.946)** (1.085)** (1.100)** (1.105)** (1.053)** 
τ21: receipt of disbursement 2 
2.061 2.129 2.148 2.111 2.114 
(1.065)* (1.167)* (1.163)* (1.157)* (1.179)* 
τ20 ≡ τ21 + τ10 
-0.248 -0.442 -0.475 -0.173 -0.451 
(0.577) (0.669) (0.686) (0.666) (0.599) 
Reweighted No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score control(s) No Yes Yes No Yes 
Xh controls No No No Yes No 
Number of households 6,992 6,992 6,992 6,992 6,992 
R
2
 0.013 0.017 0.018 0.074 0.021 
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is Δ weekly hours worked per adult between 2005 and 2006, which is calculated 
as total hours worked divided by number of adult household members. Columns 2–5 are estimated by weighted least squares 
where the weights for treatment households equal one and the weights for control households are given by the normalized 
ω=
h
Pˆ /(1−
h
Pˆ ). Standard errors clustered by village. All columns include province fixed effects. 
  ∗Significant at 10%. 
  ∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗Significant at 1%. 
 
 
4.2 Labor Supply 
 
In this subsection, we briefly discuss the potential effects of the UCT on the labor supply of 
household members >10 years old and not currently enrolled in school. (In results available 
upon request, we find no evidence that the UCT program led to changes in the labor supply 
of children enrolled in school.) Our preferred metric of labor supply is total hours worked per 
household divided by the number of working age adults not currently enrolled in school. We 
advocate this measure instead of a simple average over household members for several 
reasons. First, we wish to remain relatively agnostic as to the complex determinants of the 
intra-household substitutability of labor. Second, we aim to capture implicitly the dependency 
ratios for a given household. For example, if a certain household relies on the labor supply of 
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two individuals, we would prefer to assign a larger increase in labor supply for a given hour 
compared with a household relying on the labor of three individuals. Third, lacking strong 
priors on functional form or a readily available instrumental variable, we avoid distinguishing 
between the extensive and intensive margins of labor force participation. 
 
In Table 12, we consider the difference in labor supply between periods as the dependent 
variable and deploy the same set of reweighting estimators as before. We find that the first 
UCT disbursement is associated with a reduction of around 1.7 hours worked per adult in the 
last week. These are economically meaningful effects given a baseline mean of 22 hours 
worked per adult. However, they are not robust to the most flexible control function 
specification in column 5. Nor do they appear to be any statistically meaningful differences 
between nonrecipients and recipients that received two quarterly transfers by midline (
20
ˆ is 
null). In other words, the negative labor supply response in columns 2–4 is largely confined to 
those recipient households still awaiting their second transfer at the time of enumeration in 
early 2006. A potential explanation for this finding is that in early 2006 households had re-
optimized their labor supply to a lower level in anticipation of receiving transfers at a given 
date in the near future. Insomuch as those decisions had persistent effects (e.g., previously 
declined positions were already filled), it may have been difficult for households to increase 
their labor in response to the delayed receipt of the second quarterly transfer. 
 
The bottom panel of 12 shows that short term labor supply effects remain several months 
after the final disbursement arrived in late 2006. It is somewhat puzzling that these labor 
supply differentials persist well after the time by which all recipients should have received the 
full set of four quarterly transfers. One possibility is that the short-run persistence argument 
has long-run consequences. 
 
Table 13. Intensive Margin Treatment Effects on Labor Supply 
Estimator 
OLS IPW 
Double Robust Control 
Function (
h
Pˆ ) (Xh) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Δ 2005-2006 
transfers per capita              
(Rp000,000s ) 
0.373 -0.592 -0.609 -0.391 -0.202 
(0.363) (0.610) (0.603) (0.481) (0.458) 
 Δ 2005-2007 
transfers per capita              
(Rp000,000s) 
-0.329 -0.406 -0.437 -0.256 -0.280 
(0.483) (0.561) (0.566) (0.531) (0.561) 
Treatment indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household size indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reweighted No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Propensity score control(s) No Yes Yes No Yes 
Xh controls No No No Yes No 
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is Δweekly hours worked per adult between 2005 and 2007, which is 
calculated as total hours worked divided by number of adult household members. Columns 2–5 are estimated by weighted 
least squares where the weights for treatment households equal one and the weights for control households are given by 
the normalized ω=
h
Pˆ /(1−
h
Pˆ ). Standard errors clustered by village. All columns include province fixed effects. 
∗Significant at 10%. 
∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗Significant at 1%. 
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Lastly, in Table 13, we show that although hours worked per adult are declining in transfers 
per capita (conditional on disbursements received), these effects are relatively small and 
statistically imprecise. Nor are there meaningful differences in the estimated effects over the 
short- versus medium-term. 
 
 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
 
 
In this section, we reconcile the main empirical results (for expenditures) with a conceptual 
framework based on the permanent income hypothesis (PIH). 
 
 
5.1 Interpreting Treatment Effects through the PIH 
 
Starting from a standard Euler equation for household h in period t,  
 
 u'(Ch,t−1)=(1+δ)
−1Et−1 (1+r)u
'(Cht) ,  
 
the PIH under certainty equivalence (quadratic preferences, intertemporal separability, perfect 
credit markets) and income uncertainty implies  
 
 ΔCht= 
r
1+r 1− 
1
(1+r)T−t+1
−1
 
τ=0
T−t
 (1+r)−τ(Et−Et−1)Yh,t+τ,  (3) 
 
where Yh,t+τ=εh,t+τ  is income at time t+τ (see Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2010). Adding a 
permanent component to income Yh,t+τ=Ph,t+τ+εh,t+τ  (where htrthrth
PP
1,, ) and 
pushing out to infinity, we obtain  
 
 
hththt
r
r
C
1
, 
 
where period t savings is given by 
 
 Sht=− 
j=1
∞
  
EtΔYh,t+j
(1+r)j
= 
1
1+rεht.  (4) 
 
These equations provide a simple framework for understanding the observed effects of the 
UCT program on consumption or expenditures. 
 
In keeping with the empirical context, we consider expenditure growth between periods t (or t+1) 
and t−1 and abstract away from permanent components of income. Restating the above expressions 
in logs (after imposing the relevant assumptions on the utility function), equation (3) implies  
 
 ΔlnCht=  
r
1+r (lnYht−Et−1lnYht). (5) 
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Suppose income lnYht=Wht+Dht where Wht is the real wage and Dht is a potentially nonzero 
nominal government transfer, which by definition (and public law) is transitory. For simplicity, 
let Wht=εht. 
 
Using equation (5), we consider several possibilities for the expenditure patterns of UCT 
recipients and nonrecipients. First, consider nonrecipients. Suppose that nonrecipient 
household h′ had no prior expectation of being a transfer beneficiary (i.e., they were informed 
at time t−1 that they would not be receiving any benefits in the future). This implies that their 
expenditure growth can be written as  
 
 ΔlnCh't=  
r
1+r εh't. (6) 
 
There are now multiple cases to consider for UCT recipients. First, suppose that all identified 
beneficiaries anticipated (at time t−1) that they would have received two transfer 
disbursements by time t in early 2006. Then, for recipients that realized two transfer 
disbursements D by enumeration in early 2006, we obtain  
 
 ΔlnCht=  
r
1+r εht. (7) 
 
That is, on average, these households exhibit identical expenditure growth to nonrecipients. 
Empirically, the reweighting procedure detailed above ensures that recipient and nonrecipient 
households draw from same income distribution (i.e., E[εht]=E[εh't]). However, for those 
recipients that realized only one transfer by enumeration in early 2006, 
 
 ΔlnCht=  
r
1+r (εht−Dht),  (8) 
 
where the −D
ht
 term captures the “surprise” effect of not having received the second 
disbursement by the time anticipated ex ante. In other words, these households would have 
drawn down savings in anticipation of the second disbursement (see equation (4)). However, 
its late arrival meant that the household was left with insufficient liquidity in the week(s) just 
prior to Susenas enumeration. 
 
If we define t−1 as the period immediately after the announcement of the program benefits 
and implementation schedule, then equations (6)-(8) provide a justification for the treatment 
effects reported in Table 5. These equations are also consistent with the largest expenditure 
differences being observed for food rather than nonfood items (see Table 6) since the 
former is reported over the week immediately prior to enumeration whereas the latter is 
reported over the month prior to enumeration. Moreover, this framework can also explain 
why the differential treatment effects in Table 5 dissipate by 2007. Taking a longer two-
period difference in log expenditures between t−1 and t+1, the surprise effect in equation 
(8) no longer holds as all recipients received all four quarterly transfers as expected by the 
end of 2006.  
 
On the other hand, if eventual recipient households did not anticipate the UCT program at 
time t−1, then equation (5) implies  
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 ΔlnCht=  
r
1+r (εht+2Dht) (9) 
 
for households realizing two disbursements by early 2006 and  
 
 ΔlnCht=  
r
1+r (εht+Dht) (10) 
 
for households realizing only one disbursement. For r>0, this implies (i) that recipients should 
have higher expenditure growth than nonrecipients and (ii) that recipients of two 
disbursements should have higher growth than recipients of one disbursement. Implication (ii) 
is borne out in Table 5, but implication (i) is not.  
 
Although both formulations are informative, neither is dispositive. Taking the period around 
baseline enumeration in February–April 2005 as t−1 (and the midline follow-up enumeration 
period in February–April 2006 as t), no Indonesian household could have anticipated the 
subsidy cuts and cash transfer program implemented later that year since the government had 
not yet publicized their plans for such a program. Given this timeline, it is difficult to justify 
the initial formulation despite its obvious appeal. Yet, the second formulation in which the 
transfers were entirely unexpected requires ignoring the sharp break in expectations over 
future income that occurred around September 2005 midway between baseline and midline 
follow-up enumeration. One can see the potential problems with this by taking subannual 
time horizons in equation (3) and recalling that food expenditures are reported over the last 
week while nonfood expenditures are reported over the last month (or last year). 
 
Despite their stark differences, the two timing regimes coincide in the predicted expenditure 
growth differential between recipients of one relative to two disbursements over the short term. 
Under both expectations regimes, recipients of two disbursements should have expenditure 
growth that is roughly [r/(1+r)]×D greater than recipients still awaiting their second 
disbursement at the time of enumeration. Taking the estimates of τ21 from Table 5, we obtain rˆ
≈0.075. Moreover, as discussed above, the estimates of ψ in Table 10 imply a marginal 
propensity to consume out of transfer of around 0.08-0.10, implying similar estimates of r.  
 
In practice, all of the above predictions hinge on the real interest rate r being nonzero. While 
nominal interest rates quoted by the government were indeed quite high around this time, so 
was inflation on account of the fuel subsidy cutbacks. Even if r≈0, households may respond 
to transitory income shocks if they are liquidity-constrained because, for example, credit 
markets are imperfect. We turn now to a test of this prediction among Indonesian households 
in our sample in order to rule out concerns that the household response to the UCT was 
somehow anomalous and the PIH-based explanation spurious. 
 
 
5.2 Household Responses to Other Transitory Income Shocks 
 
Given evidence that Indonesian households respond to transitory UCT benefits, we examine in 
this brief subsection whether households exhibit similar responses to other types of transitory 
income shocks. Following others in the development literature beginning with Paxson (1992), we 
exploit spatial and time series variation in rainfall, a transitory source of income fluctuations across 
the Indonesian archipelago. For individual h residing in village v, we measure the transitory rainfall 
shock in year t as the log rainfall level in that kabupaten over the province-specific growing season 
minus the log mean rainfall level for that kabupaten over the forty years/seasons prior to t.27 
                                                 
27Due to merging difficulties, we are forced to drop households residing in villages in Papua. 
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Table 14. (Agricultural Household) Expenditures Respond to Transitory Rainfall 
Shocks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
log rainfall mean deviation 0.031 -0.048 -0.041 -0.055 -0.028 
 (0.074) (0.100) (0.078) (0.080) (0.072) 
1(rural village)  -0.005    
  (0.020)    
1(rural village) × rainfall shock  0.126    
  (0.112)    
1(agriculture primary income)   0.017   
   (0.015)   
1(agri. primary income) × rainfall shock   0.218   
   
(0.090)
**
 
  
1(own any agri. land)    -0.001  
    (0.015)  
1(own any agri. land) × rainfall shock    0.171  
    (0.094)*  
agri. land (Ha)     0.001 
     (0.003) 
agri. land (Ha) × rainfall shock     0.063 
     (0.029)** 
 Number of households 8,922 8,922 8,922 8,922 8,922 
R
2
 0.042 0.043 0.044 0.043 0.045 
Note: The dependent variable in all specifications is Δlog total household expenditures per capita between 2005 and 2006. 
The rainfall shock is the log deviation of the seasonal rainfall level in the kabupaten from the long-run (1952–2004) 
kabupaten mean. Standard errors clustered by kabupaten. All columns include province fixed effects. The interaction terms 
are as observed at baseline. 
∗Significant at 10%. 
∗∗Significant at 5%. 
∗∗∗Significant at 1%. 
 
The key message from Table 14 is that transitory rainfall shocks are associated with higher 
growth in household expenditures. However, the expenditure response is largely confined to 
those households in the agricultural sector, and particularly those with any land-holdings. In 
column 1, we find no relationship between rainfall shocks and consumption. However, allowing 
the elasticity to vary across rural and urban areas in column 2, we find a positive elasticity of 
expenditure growth with respect to rainfall shocks that is around 0.13 albeit imprecisely 
estimated. Moreover, in columns 3–5, we find that households reporting agricultural activities as 
their primary income and owning any agricultural land exhibit a small albeit statistically precise 
and economically meaningful expenditure response to transitory changes in income associated 
with rainfall shocks. The estimate in column 3 suggests that in agricultural households, a 10% 
deviation of rainfall from its long-run mean yields roughly a 2.2% increase in consumption. The 
elasticity is of similar magnitude in column 4 when restricting to land-owning households. Taken 
together, these results suggest that Indonesian household expenditures are more responsive to 
transitory income shocks than would be predicted under the classical permanent income 
hypothesis in the absence of borrowing constraints.28 
                                                 
28Although rainfall shocks only affect the transitory income and hence expenditures of certain segments of the (rural) 
population, the UCT benefits and especially the intensive margin of treatment do not have heterogeneous effects along 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
 
This paper has considered the importance of timing and expectations in interpreting the 
household expenditure response to unconditional cash transfers in Indonesia. Our empirical 
strategy relied on nationally representative panel data, difference-in-difference re-weighting 
estimators, and the staggered rollout of the second quarterly transfer. Our findings highlight 
the benefit of having multiple sources of variation in transfer income. The staggered rollout 
allowed us to identify differential treatment effects depending on the timing of the second 
transfer. On average, beneficiary households that received the full two transfers as expected by 
early 2006 do not differ from comparable nonbeneficiaries in terms of per capita expenditure 
growth and changes in labor supply per adult. However, beneficiaries still unexpectedly 
awaiting their second transfer report 7 percentage point lower expenditure growth and a 
differential reduction in labor supply by an additional 1.5 hours per adult per week on average. 
Using the third wave of panel data, we find that the expenditure differences dissipate by early 
2007, several months after the final transfer was received by all beneficiaries. Using the fact 
that the transfer amount per disbursement was fixed across households, we are able to identify 
a small, short-run marginal propensity to consume out of transfer income of around 0.10. We 
reconcile our findings with insights of a simple permanent income model and largely rule out 
alternative explanations based on missing or imperfect data. 
 
In addition to offering a new way of understanding the household response to unconditional 
cash transfers, our paper also relates more generally to the literature on the role of cash 
transfers in policy reform in developing countries. Unlike numerous programs in Latin 
America and elsewhere, the UCT in Indonesia was not explicitly designed as a transformative 
poverty alleviation program. Rather, the government used the program as means of 
transitioning away from regressive fuel subsidies. Similar subsidy reforms have either recently 
been implemented or are being considered across a number of developing countries (Coady et 
al., 2010). These programs have a number of important welfare implications and warrant 
further study. Our results from Indonesia suggest that the household response to cash 
transfers in such contexts may hinge strongly on perceived program duration as well as the 
timing of the transfers with respect to subsidy cutbacks. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
these same dimensions. These results (available upon request) increase our confidence in the interpretation of the UCT 
benefits as a transitory income shock in the context of the PIH framework considered above. 
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APPENDIX 
Propensity Scores and Reconstructed Quasi-PMT Scores 
 
 
To estimate the probability that household h receives treatment d, P(D
h
=d | X
h
), we consider the 
following specification, which roughly approximates information on household h available to 
enumerators and local officials in mid-2005,  
 
P(Dh=d)=F βX
fam
h +γX
house
h +αX
head
h +δX
welfare
h +ζ
d
h>0 ,  (11) 
 
All right-hand variables are observed in February 2005: fam
h
X  is a vector of demographic 
variables including household age structure, gender breakdown; house
h
X  contains variables 
pertaining to the quality of the physical structures in which household h lives; head
h
X  are 
characteristics of the head of the household, welfare
h
X  contain indicators for employment among 
household members, prior participation in government welfare programs, and amount of land 
owned; F is the relevant CDF; and ζh captures all variables unobservable to the econometrician 
but possibly observable to program administrators. We also control for province fixed effects to 
subsume some of the regional differences in targeting infrastructure (among other things). A full 
elaboration of the coefficient estimates was reported in Table 2.29 Given our large set of dummy 
variables, there is little advantage estimating equation (11) nonparametrically.30 
 
 
         Binned CDF of (Pseudo-) PMT score sans assets  Binned of predicted Pr(BLT receipt |X) or propensity score 
Figure A1. Comparing propensity score estimates and approximated quasi-PMT scores 
Note: LEFT–The circles capture the share of UCT (BLT) recipients within the given bin where the bins are 0.05 width 
slices of the CDF of the quasi-PMT scores approximated using the procedures described in the text. The dashed 
vertical line constitutes the 30% threshold above which households were (in theory) supposed to receive the program. 
RIGHT–The circles capture the share or UCT (BLT) recipients within the given bin where the bins are 0.05 width slices 
of the CDF of the propensity scores obtained from estimating a binary version of equation (11) by maximum likelihood 
where ζ
h
 is logistic distributed. 
                                                 
29The official eligibility survey grouped several response categories to questions in Susenas concerning household 
characteristics. Whether one leaves the individual responses as separate indicators (in a fully saturated sense) or groups 
them according to the rubric in the original survey does not matter for the qualitative findings presented below. 
30Doing so using the Klein and Spady (1993) estimator yields an estimated propensity score that has a 0.95 
correlation with the simpler parametric logit. 
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As discussed in Section 3.1, although we made every effort to reconstruct the underlying PMT 
scores using available data, the resulting scores were not discriminating enough to allow for 
even a fuzzy regression-discontinuity research design. After transforming applicable questions 
in Susenas 2005 into the corresponding variable-specific eligibility criteria, we apply the 
kabupaten-specific PMT coefficients corresponding to the given variables to produce a measure 
Ph. This variable reflects a data-constrained approximation to the actual PMT scores based on 
the original eligibility survey.31 According to program guidelines, households with PMT scores 
above the 70th percentile should qualify for benefits. We take this rule to our estimates Ph in 
search of a potential discontinuity. Unfortunately, as seen in Figure A1, no such discontinuity 
can be found—perhaps unsurprisingly given the evidence on leakage and undercoverage. 
Moreover, the actual probability of UCT receipt looks quite similar across the distribution of 
the estimated propensity scores  Ph. Yet, if we predict the probability of program receipt using 
Ph as the only regressor—effectively fixing (β,γ,δ,α) in equation 11 at the kabupaten-specific 
PMT coefficients—and accordingly reweight households in the control group, the balance at 
baseline is much worse than when using our arguably more flexible approach based on a 
richer set of variables plausibly in the information set of local officials engaged in community-
based alongside or possibly in defiance of official targeting. This can be seen by comparing the 
effect of reweighting the control group in Figure A2, which uses Ph, and Figure 5 discussed in 
the paper, which uses our estimated propensity scores. 
 
 
Log household expenditure/capita, 2005 (baseline) 
Figure A2. Baseline expenditure distributor by treatment status 
Note: All distributions estimated using Epanechnikov kernel and a rule-of-thumb bandwidth. The “Control 
(Reweighted)” observations are adjusted using inverse probability weights (IPW) based on normalized estimated odds 
of treatment )ˆ1/(ˆ PP , where 
h
Pˆ is as described in Appendix A. 
 
                                                 
31Prior to this, we rescale the coefficients to ensure that they sum to 1 after dropping the questions not available 
in Susenas. 
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